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Global production networks (GPN) transform the production and use of 
knowledge, with far-reaching implications for an evolutionary theory of economic 
change. There is a fundamental trend towards increasing mobility of knowledge, yet little 
do we know about drivers and implications. Twenty years after the pioneering book of 
Nelson and Winter (1982), it is time to develop a research agenda that addresses these 
transformations, based on a combination of appreciative theory, case studies, econometric 
work and formal modeling. 
 
A major constraint is a lack of communication between research on GPN, 
research on international knowledge diffusion, and research on local capability 
formation. While all three are highly relevant strands of research, their lack of interaction 
obstructs our understanding of how global networks affect knowledge diffusion and the 
formation of local capabilities. There is a need to bridge this gap through “appreciative 




This paper develops a conceptual framework that links together the above three 
areas of research, as a first step towards an appreciative theory. We argue that 
globalization has culminated in an important organizational innovation: the spread of 
GPN. These networks combine concentrated dispersion of the value chain across firm 
and national boundaries, with a parallel process of integration of hierarchical layers of 
network participants. This has created new opportunities for international knowledge 
diffusion that lower-tier network suppliers should strive to exploit. To substantiate this 
argument, we proceed as follows. Section 1 sketches our research agenda, while section 2 
analyzes the three dynamic forces that drive the rapid development of GPN. Section 3 
highlights the economic structure and peculiar characteristics of the flagship model of 
GPN. Section 4 explores the categories of knowledge, and the mechanisms of knowledge 
transfer from flagship companies to local network suppliers. And in section 5, we discuss 
under what conditions GPN can act as mediators of local capability formation. We 
conclude with policy and management implications for global flagships and local 
suppliers, and spell out priorities for future research. 
 
1. RESEARCH AGENDA 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have been around for a long time (e.g., 
Wilkins, 1970). Until recently, their international production has focused on the 
penetration of protected markets through tariff-hopping investments, and on the use of 
assets developed at home to exploit international factor cost differentials, primarily for 
                                                            
1 In contrast to  formal growth theories, appreciative theories do not attempt to compress stylized facts into 
rigorous formulations. Rather, an attempt is made to include more of the observed empirical richness of IT 
and transformations in business organization than formal theories. This of course comes at the cost of 
being unable to model these relationships mathematically. Hence the need for formal theories. But for the 
latter to be fruitful, they need to be based on appreciative theories, and on the findings of case studies and 
econometric analysis. labor (e.g., Dunning, 1981). This has given rise to a peculiar pattern of international 
production: offshore production sites in low-cost locations are linked through triangular 
trade with the major markets in North America and Europe (e.g., Dicken, 1992). 
 
A progressive liberalization and deregulation of international trade and 
investment, and the rapid development and diffusion of information and communication 
technology (IT) have fundamentally changed the global competitive dynamics, in which 
MNCs operate. While both market access and cost reductions remain important, it 
became clear that they have to be reconciled with a number of equally important 
requirements that encompass: the exploitation of uncertainty through improved 
operational flexibility (e.g., Kogut 1985; and Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994); a compression 
of speed-to-market through reduced product development and product life cycles (e.g., 
Flaherty, 1986); learning and the acquisition of specialized external capabilities (e.g., 
Antonelli, 1992; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Zander and Kogut, 1995; Zanfei, 2000; 
Dunning, 2000); and a shift of market penetration strategies from established to new and 
unknown markets (e.g., Christensen, 1997).  
 
In response to the increasingly demanding requirements of global competition, 
three interrelated transformations have occurred in the organization of international 
economic transactions. First, global production networks (GPN) have proliferated as a 
major organizational innovation in global operations (e.g., Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 
2000). Second, these networks have acted as a catalyst for international knowledge 
diffusion, providing new opportunities for local capability formation in lower-cost 
locations outside the industrial heartlands of North America, Western Europe and Japan. 
Third, a long-term process of “digital convergence” (e.g., Chandler and Cortada, 2000), 
enabling the same infrastructure to accommodate manipulation and transmission of voice, 
video, and data, has created new opportunities for organizational learning and knowledge 
exchange across organizational and national boundaries, hence magnifying the first two 
transformations.  
 
The combination of these three transformations has changed dramatically the 
international geography of production and innovation. We focus on the first two of these 
transformations
2. The first transformation signals a new divide in industrial organization: 
a transition is under way from “multinational corporations”, with their focus on stand-
alone overseas investment projects, to “global network flagships” that integrate their 
dispersed supply, knowledge and customer bases into global (& regional) production 
networks (Ernst, 1997b and 2001a). There is a growing acceptance in the literature that, 
to capture the impact of globalization on industrial organization and knowledge diffusion, 
the focus of research needs to move from the industry and the individual firm to the 
international dimension of business networks (e.g., Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Gereffi 
and Korzeniewicz, 1994; UNCTAD, 1993; Rugman and D´Cruz, 2000; Birkinshaw and 
Hagstrøm, 2000). 
 
                                                            
2 The impact of “digital convergence” is addressed in Ernst 2001 c and 2001d 
  2 But our understanding of these networks is limited. Research on GPN is at the 
formative stage and shares three common weaknesses. First, most studies have focused 
too narrowly on the perspective of the network flagship (“flagship bias”) (e.g., Rugman 
and D`Cruz (2000). We need research that explores as well implications for network 
suppliers, especially lower-tier suppliers from developing countries. Second, research has 
focused primarily on the geographic dispersion of tangible production, but tells us little 
about other aspects of global networks (“production bias”). While global networks in 
financial services are relatively well covered, we need research on the evolving global 
networks of business and information services (such as research presented in Aharoni and 
Nachum, 2000). Third, there is also an “R&D bias”: research has focused narrowly on the 
relocation of R&D and strategic alliances primarily among regions in the US, Western 
Europe and Japan (e.g., Birkinshaw and Hagstrøm, 2000; Rugman and D`Cruz, 2000) 
The impact of GPN on the diffusion of other forms of knowledge, especially knowledge-
intensive support services, has been largely neglected, and this is true in particular for 
their diffusion to lower-cost locations. 
 
We adopt a broader approach, analyzing as well the geographic dispersion of 
cross-functional, knowledge-intensive support services that are intrinsically linked with 
production, such as human resource management, global supply chain management, and 
knowledge management. Even if these activities do not involve formal R&D, they still 
give rise to considerable international knowledge diffusion and knowledge sharing 
(Ernst, 2001 b). 
 
Equally important is the second transformation: GPN in their operations 
reportedly disseminate important knowledge to local suppliers in low-cost locations, 
which could catalyze local capability formation. Knowledge transfer, however, is not 
automatic. It requires a significant level of absorptive capacity on the part of local 
suppliers and a complex process to internalize disseminated knowledge. But our 
understanding of knowledge transfer and local capability formation is limited. 
International knowledge transfer has been extensively studied, but research has primarily 
focused on such formal mechanisms as foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign 
licensing (FL) (Reddy and Zhao, 1990). These formal mechanisms, however, are only the 
tip of the iceberg. A larger amount of knowledge is transferred through various informal 
mechanisms (Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman, 1985; Kim, 1991; 1997; Ernst, Ganiatsos 
and Mytelka, 1998; Ernst, 2000a). Research on informal knowledge transfer is scarce. 
The importance of local capabilities in assimilating, adapting, and improving imported 
technology has long been recognized, but few studies exist on the complex process of 
local capability formation in developing countries.  
 
2. FORCES DRIVING GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
 
What has driven the shift in industrial organization from “multinational 
corporations” to “global network flagships” that integrate their dispersed supply, 
knowledge and customer bases into global (& regional) production networks? To answer 
this question, we introduce a stylized model of globalization drivers, focusing on three 
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information technology, and competition. 
 
2.1. Institutional Change: Liberalization 
 
North (1996; 12) defines institutions as “the rules of the game of a society that 
structure human interaction.” They are composed of formal rules (statute law, common 
law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behavior, and self-imposed 
codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both. Institutions shape the 
allocation of resources, the rules of competition and firm behavior.  
 
We take liberalization as convenient shorthand for institutional changes that affect 
globalization. Liberalization dates back to the early 1970s: it thrived in response to the 
breakdown of fixed exchange rate regimes and the failure of Keynesianism to cope with 
pervasive stagflation. To a large degree, it has been initiated by government policies. But 
there are also other actors that have played an important role: financial institutions; rating 
agencies; supra-national institutions like bi-lateral or multi-lateral investment treaties and 
regional integration schemes, like the EU or NAFTA.  In some countries with 
decentralized devolution of political power, regional governments can also play an 
important role. 
 
Liberalization includes four main elements: trade liberalization; liberalization of 
capital flows; liberalization of FDI policies; and privatization. While each of these has 
generated separate debates in the literature, they hang together. Earlier success in trade 
liberalization has sparked an expansion of trade and FDI, increasing the demand for 
cross-border capital flows. This has increased the pressure for a liberalization of capital 
markets, forcing more and more countries to open their capital accounts. In turn this has 
led to a liberalization of FDI policies, and to privatization tournaments.  
 
The overall effect of liberalization has been a considerable reduction in the cost 
and risks of international transactions and a massive increase in international liquidity. 
Global corporations (the network flagships) have been the primary beneficiaries: 
liberalization provides them with a greater range of choices for market entry between 
trade, licensing, subcontracting, franchising, etc. (locational specialization) than 
otherwise; it provides better access to external resources and capabilities that a flagship 
needs to complement its core competencies (outsourcing); and it has reduced the 
constraints for a geographic dispersion of the value chain (spatial mobility). 
 
We also need to emphasize a perplexing result: as liberalization has been adopted 
as an almost universal policy doctrine, it has lost much of its earlier power to influence 
locational decisions. As their FDI policies become indistinguishable, host countries are 
forced to differentiate themselves by other means, and to implement much more 
aggressive policies. The result has been a rapid proliferation of complementary policies 
geared to business facilitation and the development of created assets. This explains why 
a replication of clustering effects at multiple locations is now a realistic option. 
2.2. The Dual Impact of Information and Communication Technology 
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A second important driver of GPN has been the rapid development and diffusion 
of information and communication technology (IT). These technologies have had a dual 
impact:  they increase the need and create new opportunities for globalization. This 
argument is based on two propositions. First, the cost and risk of developing IT has been 
a primary cause for market globalization: international markets are required to amortize 
fully the enormous R&D expenses associated with rapidly evolving process and product 
information technologies (Kobrin, 1997, p.149). Of equal importance are the huge 
expenses for IT-based organizational innovations. (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Ernst 
and O`Connor, 1992: chapter 1). As the extent of a company´s R&D effort is determined 
by the nature of its technology and competition rather than its size, this rapid growth of 
R&D spending requires a corresponding expansion of sales, if profitability is to be 
maintained. No national market, not even the US market, is large enough to amortize 
such huge expenses. 
 
A second proposition explains why international production rather than exports 
have become the main vehicle for international market share expansion. Of critical 
importance has been the enabling role played by IT: it has substantially increased the 
mobility, i.e. dispersion of firm-specific resources and capabilities across national 
boundaries; it also provides greater scope for cross-border linkages, i.e.the integration of 
dispersed specialized clusters. This has substantially reduced the friction of time and 
space, both with regard to markets and production: a firm can now serve distant markets 
equally well as local producers; it can also now disperse its value chain across national 
borders in order to select the most cost-effective location. 
 
In addition, IT and related organizational innovations provide effective 
mechanisms for constructing flexible infrastructures that can link together and coordinate 
economic transactions at distant locations (Hagstrøm, 2000; Antonelli, 1992). This has 
important implications for organizational choices and locational strategies of firms. In 
essence, IT fosters the development of leaner, meaner and more agile production systems 
that cut across firm boundaries and national borders. The underlying vision is that of a 
network of firms that enable a global network flagship to respond quickly to changing 
circumstances, even if much of its value chain has been dispersed. 
 
2.3. Competition and Industrial Organization 
 
Together with liberalization, IT has drastically changed the dynamics of 
competition. Again, we reduce the complexity of these changes and concentrate on two 
impacts: a broader geographic scope of competition; and a growing complexity of 
competitive requirements. Competition now cuts across national borders - a firm´s 
position in one country is no longer independent from its position in other countries (e.g., 
Porter, 1990). This has two implications. The firm must be present in all major growth 
markets (dispersion).  It must also integrate its activities on a worldwide scale, in order to 
exploit and coordinate linkages between these different locations (integration). 
Competition also cuts across sector boundaries and market segments: mutual raiding of 
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firms to identify market niches and to grow with them.  
 
This has forced firms to engage in complex strategic games to pre-empt a 
competitors’ move. This is especially the case for knowledge-intensive industries like 
electronics (Ernst, 2001a). Intense price competition needs to be combined with product 
differentiation, in a situation where continuous price wars erode profit margins. Of 
critical importance, however, is speed-to-market: getting the right product to the largest 
volume segment of the market right on time can provide huge profits. Being late can be a 
disaster, and may even drive a firm out of business. The result has been an increasing 
uncertainty and volatility, and a destabilization of established market leadership positions 
(Richardson, 1996; Ernst, 1998).  
 
This growing complexity of competition has changed the determinants of firm 
organization and growth, as well as the determinants of location. No firm, not even a 
dominant market leader, can generate all the different capabilities internally that are 
necessary to cope with the requirements of global competition. Competitive success thus 
critically depends on a capacity to selectively source specialized capabilities outside the 
firm that can range from simple contract assembly to quite sophisticated design 
capabilities. This requires a shift from individual to increasingly collective forms of 
organization, from the multidivisional (M-form) functional hierarchy (e.g., Williamson, 
1975 and 1985; Chandler, 1977) of “multinational corporations” to the networked global 
flagship model (Ernst, 2001 c). 
 
Take the electronics industry, which has become the most important breeding 
ground for this new industrial organization model. Over the last decades, a massive 
process of vertical specialization has segmented an erstwhile vertically integrated 
industry into closely interacting horizontal layers (Grove, 1996). An important catalyst 
was the availability of standard components, which allowed for a change in computer 
design away from centralized (IBM mainframe) to decentralized architectures (PC, and 
PC-related networks). This has given rise to the co-existence of complex, globally 
organized product- specific value chains (e.g., for microprocessors, memories, board 
assembly, PCs, operating systems, applications software, and networking equipment).  
 
Each of these value chains consists of a variety of GPN that compete with each 
other, but that may also cooperate (Ernst, 2001b). The number of such networks, and the 
intensity of competition varies across sectors, reflecting their different stage of 
development and their idiosyncratic industry structures. Until recently, these fundamental 
changes in the organization of international production have been largely neglected in the 
literature, both in research on knowledge spill-over through FDI, and in research on the 
internationalization of corporate R&D. 
 
 
3. GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS: STRUCTURE AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 
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3.1. The Network Flagship Model 
 
The concept of a GPN covers both intra-firm and inter-firm transactions and 
forms of coordination (see Figure 1): it links together the flagship´s own subsidiaries, 
affiliates and joint ventures with its subcontractors, suppliers, service providers, as well 
as partners in strategic alliances (e.g., Ernst, 1997a, 1997b, 2001b). These arrangements 
may, or may not involve ownership of equity stakes. A network flagship like IBM or 
Intel breaks down the value chain into a variety of discrete functions and locates them 
wherever they can be carried out most effectively, where they improve the firm’s access 
to resources and capabilities and where they are needed to facilitate the penetration of 
important growth markets. 
 
The main purpose of these networks is to provide the flagship with quick and 
low-cost access to resources, capabilities and knowledge that are complementary to its 
core competencies. In other words, transaction cost savings matter. Yet, the real benefits 
result from the dissemination, exchange and outsourcing of knowledge and 
complementary capabilities.  
 
A focus on international knowledge diffusion through an extension of firm 
organization across national boundaries distinguishes our concept of GPN from network 
theories developed by sociologists, economic geographers and innovation theorists that 
focus on localized, mostly inter-personal networks (e.g., Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994: 
368-402). The central problem of these theories is that industries now operate in a global 
rather than a localized setting (Ernst, Guerrieri, et al, 2001). Important complementarities 
exist, however, with work on global commodity chains (GCC) (e.g., Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz, 1994). A primary concern of the GCC literature has been to explore how 
different value chain stages in an industry (i.e. textiles) are dispersed across borders and 
how the position of a particular location in such GCC affects its development potential.  
 
As for the dynamics of network evolution, our approach differs fundamentally 
from the transaction cost approach to networks and vertical disintegration that centers on 
the presumed efficiency gains from these organizational choices (e.g., Williamson, 1985 
and 1997; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). This approach skips some of the more 
provocative chapters in the economic history of the modern corporation.  Chandler’s 
vibrant histories (e.g., 1962) show that the quest for profits and market power via 
increased throughput and speed of coordination were more important in explaining 
hierarchy than the traditional emphasis on transaction costs. This implies that the analysis 
of the determinants of institutional form must shift away from the narrow focus on 
transactions costs to the broader competitive environment in which firms operate. It is 
time to bring back into the analysis market structure and competitive dynamics, as well 
as the role played by knowledge and innovation.  
 
Our concept of GPN similarly points to these often-overlooked dimensions of 
organizational choice. Like hierarchies, GPN not only promise to improve efficiency, but 
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specialization, and raise entry barriers (Ernst, 2001a); they also enhance the network 
flagships´ capacity for innovation (e.g., Lazonick, 2000). These considerations are of 
particular concern for developing countries' integration into GPN, and their capacity to 
strengthen their local capabilities. Two distinctive characteristics of GPN shape the scope 
for international knowledge diffusion: a rapid yet concentrated dispersion of value chain 
activities, and, simultaneously, their integration into hierarchical networks.  
 
3.2. Concentrated Dispersion 
 
GPN typically combines a breath-taking speed of geographic dispersion with 
spatial concentration: much of the recent cross-border extension of manufacturing and 
services has been concentrated on a growing, but still limited number of specialized 
lower-cost clusters. Apart from the usual suspects in Asia (Korea, Taiwan, China, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and now also India), this includes once peripheral locations in 
Europe (e.g., Ireland, Central and Eastern Europe and Russia), Brazil, Mexico, and 
Argentina in Latin America, some Carribbean locations ( like Costa Rica), and a few 
spots elsewhere in the so-called RoW (= rest of the world). 
 
The inclusion of these clusters into GPN creates new opportunities for knowledge 
diffusion to local suppliers, which could catalyze local capability formation. Different 
clusters face different opportunities and constraints, depending on the product 
composition of the GPN. The degree of dispersion differs across the value chain: it 
increases, the closer one gets to the final product, while dispersion remains concentrated 
especially for critical precision components. 
 
Let us look at some indicators in the electronics industry, a pace setter of GPN 
(Ernst, 2001b). On one end of the spectrum is final PC assembly that is widely dispersed 
to major growth markets in the US, Europe and Asia. Dispersion is still quite extended 
for standard, commodity-type components, but less so than for final assembly. For 
instance, flagships can source keyboards, computer mouse devices and power switch 
supplies from many different sources, both in Asia, Mexico and the European periphery, 
with Taiwanese firms playing a major role as intermediate supply chain coordinators. The 
same is true for lower-end printed circuit boards. Concentration of dispersion increases, 
the more we move toward more complex, capital-intensive precision components: 
memory devices and displays are sourced primarily from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore; and hard disk drives from a Singapore-centered triangle of locations in 
Southeast Asia. Finally, dispersion becomes most concentrated for high-precision, 
design-intensive components that pose the most demanding requirements on the mix of 
capabilities that a firm and its cluster needs to master: microprocessors for instance are 
sourced from a few globally dispersed affiliates of Intel, two secondary American 
suppliers, and one recent entrant from Taiwan, Via Technologies.  
 
The hard disk drive (HDD) industry provides another example both for quick 
dispersion, as well as for spatial concentration (Ernst, 1997b). Until the early 1980s, 
almost all HDD production was concentrated in the U.S., with limited additional 
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HDDs has remained in the US, while Southeast Asia dominates with almost 70% of 
world production, based on units shipped. Slightly less than half of the world´s disk 
drives come from Singapore, with most of the rest of the region´s production being 
concentrated in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
 
Seagate, the current industry leader, provides a good example of the flagship 
model of concentrated dispersion. Today, Seagate operates 22 plants worldwide: 14 of 
these plants, i.e. 64% of the total, are located in Asia. Asia's share in Seagate's worldwide 
production capacity, as expressed in sq-ft, has increased from roughly 35% in 1990 to 
slightly more than 61% in 1995 - an incredible speed of expansion. Concentrated 
dispersion is also reflected in the regional breakdown of Seagate's employment. Asia's 
share increased from around 70% in 1990 to more than 85% in 1995.  
 
In short, rapid cross-border dispersion coexists with agglomeration. GPN extend 
national clusters across national borders. This implies two things: First, some stages of 
the value chain are internationally dispersed, while others remain concentrated. And 
second, the internationally dispersed activities typically congregate in a limited number 
of overseas clusters. This clearly indicates that agglomeration economies continue to 
matter, hence the path-dependent nature of development trajectories for individual 
specialized industrial clusters. 
 
3.3. Integration: Hierarchical Layers of Network Participants 
 
A GPN encompasses both intra-firm and inter-firm linkages and integrates a 
diversity of network participants who differ in their access to and in their position within 
such networks, and hence face very different opportunities and challenges for GPN. This 
implies that GPN do not necessarily give rise to less hierarchical forms of firm 
organization (as predicted for instance in Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989, and in Nohria and 
Eccles, 1992). GPN typically consist of various hierarchical layers that range from 
network flagships that dominate such networks, down to a variety of usually smaller, 
local specialized network suppliers. This taxonomy helps to assess the different 





We distinguish two types of global flagships: i) “brand leaders” (BL), like Cisco, 
GE, IBM, Compaq or Dell; and ii) “contract manufacturers” (CM), like for instance 
Solectron or Flextronics, that establish their own GPN to provide integrated global 
supply chain services to the “global brand leaders”. Cisco is an interesting example of a 
“brand leader”: its GPN connects the flagship to 32 manufacturing plants worldwide. 
These suppliers are formally independent, but they go through a lengthy process of 
certification to ensure that they meet Cisco´s demanding requirements. Outsourcing 
volume manufacturing and related support services enable “brand leaders” to combine 
cost reduction, product differentiation and time-to-market. Equally important are 




“Contract manufacturers” have rapidly increased in importance since the mid-
1990s. This represents an acceleration of a long-standing trend towards vertical 
specialization in the electronics industry (Mowery and Macher, 2001). The role model of 
CM-type network flagships is Solectron that only a few years ago was a typical SME, but 
has transformed itself into the electronics industry`s largest CM. With an average growth 
rate of 43% over the past five years, Solectron has increased its worldwide locations from 
about 10 in 1996 to almost 50 today (Luethje, 2001). The company defines itself now as 
a global supply chain facilitator: global brand leaders “… can turn to Solectron at any 
stage of the supply chain, anywhere in the world, and get the highest-quality, most 
flexible solutions to optimize their existing supply chains “ (Solectron, 2000: 1).  
 
The flagship is at the heart of a network: it provides strategic and organizational 
leadership beyond the resources that, from an accounting perspective, lie directly under 
its management control (Rugman, 1997: 182). The strategy of the flagship company thus 
directly affects the growth, the strategic direction and network position of lower-end 
participants, like specialized suppliers and subcontractors. The latter, in turn, “ have no 
reciprocal influence over the flagship strategy” (Rugman and D´Cruz, 2000, p.84)
4. The 
flagship derives its strength from its control over critical resources and capabilities that 
facilitate innovation (e.g., Lazonick, 2000), and from its capacity to coordinate 
transactions and knowledge exchange between the different network nodes. Both are the 
sources of its superior capacity for generating profits.  
 
Increasing vertical specialization is the fundamental driver of this flagship model 
of industrial organization (Ernst, 2001a). Flagships retain in-house activities in which 
they have a particular strategic advantage; they outsource those in which they do not. It is 
important to emphasize the diversity of such outsourcing patterns (Mowery and Macher, 
2001; Ernst, 1997b). Some flagships focus on design, product development and 
marketing, outsourcing volume manufacturing and related support services. Other 
flagships outsource as well a variety of high-end, knowledge-intensive support services. 
This includes for instance trial production (prototyping and ramping-up), tooling and 
equipment, benchmarking of productivity, testing, process adaptation, product 
customization and supply chain coordination. It may also include design and product 
development.  
 
                                                            
3 Other important drivers of outsourcing include hedging against damage due to volatile markets and 
periodic excess capacity; and scale economies: surface-mount-technology (SMT) requires large production 
runs, reflecting its growing capital and knowledge intensity. 
4 With Rugman`s flagship model, we share the emphasis on the hierarchical nature of these networks. 
However, there are important differences. Rugman and D`Cruz (2000) focus on localized networks within 
a region; they also include “non-business infrastructure” as “network partners”. We do not share their  
assumption that a combination of transaction cost and resource-based theory is sufficient to explain such 
forms of business organization. 
  10 The result is that an increasing share of the value-added becomes dispersed across 
the boundaries of the firm as well as across national borders. Even if these activities do 
not involve formal R&D, they may still require a substantial diffusion of knowledge. 
Take the spread of "turnkey production arrangements" in the PC industry (Ernst, 2000): a 
flagship (e.g., Compaq) out-sources all stages of the value-chain for a particular PC 
family, except marketing; and a local lead supplier (e.g., in Taiwan) is responsible for the 
design and development of new products, as well as for manufacturing, transport and 




This example brings us to the role of local network suppliers and the factors that 
determine their network position. “Turnkey production arrangements” illustrate a 
tendency of flagships to extend outsourcing to comprise an integrated package of higher-
end support services, to be provided by a local lead supplier. Greatly simplifying, we 
distinguish two types of  local suppliers
5: higher-tier “lead suppliers” and lower-tier 
suppliers.  
 
“Higher-tier” suppliers, like for instance Taiwan´s Acer group (Ernst, 2000b) play 
an intermediary role between global flagships and local suppliers. They deal directly with 
global flagships (both “brand leaders” and “contract manufacturers”); they possess 
valuable proprietary assets (including technology); and they have developed their own 
mini-GPN (Chen & Chen, 2001). With the exception of hard-core R&D and strategic 
marketing that remain under the control of the network flagship, the lead supplier must be 
able to shoulder all steps in the value chain. As our example shows, it must even take on 
the coordination functions necessary for global supply chain management. This requires 
that the lead supplier develops dense linkages between geographically dispersed, yet 
concentrated and locally specialized clusters, integrating these into its own networks. 
 
“Lower-tier” suppliers are in a much more precarious position. Their main 
competitive advantages are low cost and speed, and flexibility of delivery. They are 
typically used as “price breakers” and “capacity buffers”, and can be dropped at short 
notice. This second group of local suppliers rarely deals directly with the global 
flagships; they interact primarily with local higher-tier suppliers. Lower-tier suppliers 
normally lack proprietary assets; their financial position is weak; and they are highly 
vulnerable to abrupt changes in markets and technology, and to financial crises. 
 
This distinction helps us to explain why some suppliers are more prone than 
others to knowledge diffusion and capability development. In most cases, “higher-tier” 
suppliers can reap substantial benefits through knowledge diffusion, while “lower-tier” 
suppliers are unlikely to benefit, unless effective support institutions and policies are in 
place. 
                                                            
5 We do not consider arms´ -length suppliers of standard (off-the-shelf) equipment and components.  In 
reality there are of course many more layers of local suppliers that hang together in complex and 
continuously evolving arrangements. 
  11  
4. GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS AND KNOWLEDGE 
DIFFUSION 
 
Let us recapitulate the fundamental rationale of GPN: they help flagships to 
sustain their competitiveness, by providing them with access to specialized suppliers at 
lower-cost locations that excel in quick and flexible response to the flagships’ 
requirements. The flagships can exert considerable pressure on local suppliers, especially 
in small developing countries: they can discipline suppliers by threatening to drop them 
from the networks whenever they fail to provide the required services at low price and 
world class quality.  
 
At the same time, GPN also act as powerful carriers of knowledge. First, flagships 
need to transfer technical and managerial knowledge to the local suppliers. This is 
necessary to upgrade the suppliers’ technical and managerial skills, so that they can meet 
the technical specifications of the flagships. Second, once a network supplier successfully 
upgrades its capabilities, this creates an incentive for flagships to transfer more 
sophisticated knowledge, including engineering, product and process development. This 
reflects the increasingly demanding competitive requirements that we referred to earlier. 
In the electronics industry for instance, product-life-cycles have been cut to six months, 
and sometimes less (Ernst, 2001a). Overseas production thus frequently occurs soon after 
the launching of new products. This is only possible if flagships share key design 
information more freely with overseas affiliates and suppliers. Speed-to-market requires 
that engineers across the different nodes of a GPN are plugged into the flagship´s design 
debates (both on-line and face-to-face) on a regular basis. 
 
Of course, knowledge transfer is not a sufficient condition for effective 
knowledge diffusion. Diffusion is completed only when transferred knowledge is 
internalized and translated into the capability of the local suppliers (e.g., Kim, 1997, and 
Ernst, Mytelka and Ganiatsos, 1998). Much depends on the types of knowledge involved 
and the mechanisms that flagships use to disseminate different types of knowledge. 
Section 4 is devoted to these issues. Equally important for effective knowledge diffusion 
however are the motivations, resources and capabilities of local suppliers, an issue that 
we address in section 5. 
 
4.1 The Categories of Knowledge 
 
Knowledge may be classified into various categories depending on the purpose of 
its use. Polanyi’s (1962) classified knowledge into explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit 
knowledge refers to knowledge that is codified in formal, systematic language (encoded 
knowledge). It is knowledge that can be combined, stored, retrieved, and transmitted with 
relative ease and through various mechanisms. With the falling cost of information 
processing and communication, due to microprocessors, optical fibers and the Internet, it 
is expected that this will increase further the mobility of explicit knowledge, making it 
accessible worldwide in real time at minimal cost (e.g., David and Foray, 1995), 
reshaping established organizational arrangements, work practices and life styles.  
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But explicit knowledge is useful only when tacit knowledge enables individuals 
and organizations to make sense of and utilize it. Tacit knowledge refers to knowledge 
that is so deeply rooted in the human body and mind that it is hard to codify and 
communicate. It is knowledge that can only be expressed through action, commitment, 
and involvement in a specific context and locality. Tacit knowledge is based on 
experience: people acquire it through observation, imitation, and practice. Its diffusion 
requires apprentice-type training and face-to-face interaction. It can also be transferred, 
however, through the movement of human carriers of such knowledge, a fact that much 
of the literature on industrial districts used to neglect. 
 
It is hard to exaggerate the importance of tacit knowledge. Nonaka (2001) for 
instance argues that it accounts for three quarters of all knowledge used by firms. Tacit 
knowledge is the key to the long-term growth of a firm: it provides the fertile intellectual 
ground for all knowledge management (Gelwick, 1976) and for the effective performance 
of an economy (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In the face of increasing uncertainties in 
globalization, tacit knowledge becomes even more important (Ernst and Lundvall, 2000). 
 
Many have attempted to unpackage the blackbox of tacit knowledge (e.g., 
Sparrow, 1998; Antonelli, 1998; Spender, 1996). For our purpose, the following 
classification, first coined by Collins (1993) and later expanded by Blackler (1995), 
appear to be most useful. Tacit knowledge may become part of the human body as skills 
(embodied knowledge); part of human being as cognitive capacity (embrained 
knowledge); routinized in organizational practice (embedded knowledge); and inculcated 
in the organization as basic assumptions, beliefs and norms (encultured knowledge). 
Different types of tacit knowledge are associated with different aspects of organizational 
activities and with different degree of difficulties in transferring it. 
 
4.2 Knowledge Transfer Mechanisms 
 
Flagships transfer knowledge across borders through various mechanisms. First, 
the transfer may be mediated through the market, involving a formal contract for terms 
and conditions between the knowledge supplier and the knowledge buyer with payment 
involved. Knowledge may also be transferred informally without any payment involved. 
Second, the flagship may play an active role, exercising significant control over the way 
in which knowledge is disseminated to and used by the local supplier. Alternatively, the 
flagship may play a passive role, having almost nothing to do with the way the local 
supplier takes advantage of available knowledge that is either embodied in or 
disembodied from the physical items. These two dimensions -market-mediation and the 
role of flagships - offer a useful two-by-two matrix, as shown in Figure 2, to identify 
different mechanisms of knowledge transfer through global production networks (Kim, 
1991).  
 
First, network flagships use largely formal mechanisms such as foreign direct 
investment (FDI), foreign licensing (FL), technical consultancies, etc. in quadrant 1 to 
transfer knowledge to local suppliers, if the latter are subsidiaries or joint venture 
  13 partners. For instance, when such flagships as Intel, Motorola, Texas Instruments, and 
Fairchild decided to outsource assembly operations of their semiconductor devices, they 
took the mechanisms of FDI, FL, and technical consultancies to establish their 
subsidiaries in the Philippines (Antonio, 2001) and other countries in Southeast Asia. 
They owned a majority ownership in the subsidiaries, licensed and transferred a complete 
production system. 
 
Second, independent local suppliers rely heavily on standard machinery in 
quadrant 2 to improve their productivity in production operations. Machinery is a major 
source of process innovation for their users (Abernathy and Townsend, 1975). Flagships 
are not necessarily the suppliers of the machinery, but they can play an important indirect 
role, by forcing independent local suppliers to purchase more sophisticated equipment to 
improve their production capabilities. For instance, Mando, one of the major auto 
components suppliers from Korea, purchased a series of robots to automate their 
production processes. Each of the robots embodied state-of-the-art production 
knowledge. The suppliers of the robots, however, had little influence over the way 
Mando used it.  
 
Third, a more direct way for flagships to transfer knowledge to independent local 
suppliers are informal mechanisms in quadrant 3, largely through the original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM) arrangements. As in the quadrant 1, flagships actively transfer 
knowledge in the form of blue prints, technical specifications, and technical assistance, 
mostly free of charge, to independent local suppliers to ensure that products and services 
produced by the latter meet the former’s technical specifications. For instance, Boeing 
outsources some parts of fuselage from independent local suppliers in Japan, Taiwan, and 
Korea. In doing so, Boeing actively provides the local suppliers technical literature, 
product specifications, and technical assistance to help them meet its specifications.  
 
Fourth, independent local suppliers can also rely on knowledge transfer 
mechanisms in quadrant 4. Like in quadrant 2, flagships exert little direct influence over 
the way independent local suppliers use such mechanisms as reverse engineering, 
observations, and human mobility to expedite upgrading their capabilities. For instance, 
lower-tier suppliers in Asia undertake reverse engineering of foreign products not so 
much to produce imitative products as to acquire knowledge embodied therein. A group 
of lower-tier suppliers often take an observation tour of foreign firms as a way to acquire 
new knowledge. The Small Industry Promotion Corporation and industry-related SME 
associations in Korea often organizes such observation tours. Human mobility in 
quadrant 4 includes not only the repatriation of top-rated engineers trained abroad but 
also the active use of experienced foreign engineers who are hired for short periods as so-
called  “moonlighters”. 
 
To what degree do the flagships use the knowledge transfer mechanisms? The 
shift from MNCs to global network flagships has expanded both the mechanisms and the 
volume of knowledge transfer. MNCs relied heavily on the mechanisms in quadrant 1 of 
Figure 2 in setting up their plants either for the penetration of protected markets or for 
exploiting differential factor costs. In contrast, flagships transfer knowledge not only 
  14 through mechanisms in quadrant 1 but also through mechanisms in quadrant 3. Flagships 
also tend to transfer more knowledge to local suppliers than vertically integrated MNCs. 
These transfers are necessary to enable local suppliers to provide the flagship with 
competitive products and services, in line with the changing requirements of markets and 
technology. Section 4.2 explores how flagships transfer explicit and tacit knowledge to 
local suppliers. 
 
Let us now turn to the local prerequisites for effective knowledge diffusion: 
Under what can local suppliers internalize transferred knowledge and use it to enhance 
their own capabilities? 
 
5. LOCAL CAPABILITY FORMATION 
 
Local suppliers can only effectively absorb knowledge disseminated by global 
network flagships, if they have developed their own capabilities. Knowledge 
internalization and capability building require individual and organizational learning. 
Individuals are the primary actors in learning and knowledge creation (Hedberg, 1981). 
They constitute local capabilities that may be combined at the organizational level. 
Organizational learning, however, is not the simple sum of individual learning. Only 
effective organizations can translate individual learning and capabilities into 




Firms create knowledge primarily through the dynamic process of conversion 
between explicit and tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1991). Tacit-to-tacit conversion (called 
socialization) takes place when tacit knowledge of one individual is shared with others 
through training, whereas explicit-to-explicit conversion (combination) takes place when 
an individual or a group combines discrete pieces of explicit knowledge into a new 
whole. Tacit-to-explicit conversion (externalization) occurs when an individual or a 
group is able to articulate the foundations of individual tacit knowledge. Finally, explicit-
to-tacit conversion (internalization) takes place when new explicit knowledge is shared 
throughout the firm and other members begin to use it to broaden, extend, and reframe 
their own tacit knowledge. Such conversion tends to become faster in speed and larger in 
scale in a spiral process, as more actors in and around the firms become involved in 
knowledge conversion. Using Japanese examples, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) develop 
a model that pictures organization knowledge creation as an upward spiral that starts 
from the individual and moves up to the organizational level.  
 
For effective knowledge conversion to lead to productive learning, it requires two 
important elements are required (See Figure 3): an existing knowledge base (most of it 
tacit knowledge), and the intensity of effort. Of the two, the intensity of effort or 
commitment is more important than the knowledge base, as the former creates the latter, 
but not vice versa (Ulrich, 1998).  Cohen and Levinthal (1990) call this  “absorptive 
capacity”. How fast and successfully the local suppliers internalize and translate 
  15 transferred knowledge into their own capability through learning will be largely 
determined by their absorptive capacity and their ability to upgrade it continuously 
 
A large part of the existing knowledge base is tacit knowledge. We have seen that 
this type of knowledge shapes individual and organizational learning. Tacit knowledge 
enables the individual as well as the organization to use both explicit and tacit knowledge 
available elsewhere and to create new knowledge through various knowledge conversion 
activities in production and R&D. Tacit knowledge also influences the nature and 
direction of learning and is responsible for its path-dependency. For instance, it is the 
richness of tacit knowledge accumulated as part of the existing knowledge base that 
enables leading suppliers in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan to implemented more 
sophisticated technological and organizational innovations than firms in other Southeast 
Asian countries.  
 
The intensity of effort, on the other hand, determines the speed of knowledge 
conversion. It represents the amount of emotional, intellectual, and physical energy that 
members of an organization invest in acquiring and converting knowledge. 
 
Exposure of individuals and firms to relevant external knowledge is insufficient, 
unless they make a conscious effort to internalize and use it. Learning how to solve 
complex problems is usually accomplished through trial-and-error involving a series of 
knowledge conversions. Hence, considerable time and effort must be directed to learning  
(Kim, 1998). For instance, Samsung was a late entrant in electronics but has evolved 
from OEM to ODM (own design manufacturing) and to OBM (own brand 
manufacturing) in both consumer and industrial electronics. It is on a par with Japanese 
and American competitors in areas such as semiconductor memory chips, flat panel 
display, and certain telecommunications technologies. These achievements are due to 
heavy investments in the development of the domestic knowledge base. For instance, 
Samsung`s R&D expenditures have soared from $8.5 million in 1980 to $905 million in 
1994 and to $1.3 billion by 1999. As a result, its U.S. patents increased from 2 to 752 and 
to 1,549 during the same period. Samsung ranked 4th in 1999 only after IBM, NEC, and 
Cannon. 
 
5.2. GPN as Mediators of Local Capability Formation 
 
Let us now examine how GPN affect the development of capabilities by local 
suppliers. Let us first look at explicit knowledge. Flagships typically provide the local 
suppliers with encoded knowledge, such as machinery that embodies new knowledge, 
blueprints, production and quality control manuals, product and service specifications, 
and training handouts. This is done to assist the suppliers in building capabilities that are 
necessary to produce products and services with the expected quality and price. 
Personnel at the local suppliers read and try to assimilate the transferred explicit 
knowledge into their tacit knowledge (internalization in Figure 4). In most cases, the 
acquisition of explicit knowledge alone is not sufficient for the local suppliers to 
assimilate and use it in production, as the translation of explicit knowledge into actual 
operations requires a significant amount of tacit knowledge. Thus, to augment the explicit 
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to the former’s site to observe how actual production systems work and to receive a 
systematic training. 
 
This can help to translate knowledge gained from the literature into actual 
operations (internalization). It also enables local engineers to internalize how the 
flagships’ organization and production systems are managed (internalization of 
embedded knowledge), and to absorb tacit knowledge directly transferred from foreign 
engineers through training (socialization). Once they return home, however, these 
engineers confront various unforeseen problems in their attempts to translate what they 
have learned at the flagships into the operational systems that exist at home. For this 
reason, the flagships also send their own engineers (embodied and embrained knowledge) 
to help local engineers debug problems in engineering and manufacturing systems 
(socialization).  
 
Take the case of subsidiaries or joint ventures. For instance, when Sony 
established Hwashin Electronics Company in Korea as a joint venture to outsource its 
consumer electronics products, it supplied not only machinery and equipment for the 
mass-production system of its joint venture partner. Sony also provided blue prints of 
products, product specifications, and production and quality control manuals (encoded 
knowledge). In addition, the flagship invited a number of Korean engineers, technicians, 
and managers to undergo training at Sony’s plant in Japan on production, organization, 
and human resource management, transferring embedded and encultured knowledge. 
Sony also dispatched a number of engineers and technicians to Korea to help Korean 
engineers debug problems encountered in operating and maintaining the production 
system and controlling the quality of products to ensure that Hwashin meet the technical 
specifications of Sony’s products (embodied and embrained knowledge). Sony had done 
these knowledge transfer activities formally as part of its FDI and FL to Hwashin. 
 
In the case of independent local suppliers, when General Electric decided to 
outsource its microwave ovens from Samsung under the OEM arrangements, it sent its 
engineers to Samsung to explain its technical specifications (encoded knowledge) and 
taught Samsung engineers master the engineering details of the product (embrained 
knowledge), (Magaziner and Patinkin, 1989). GE had done all these knowledge transfer 
activities free of charge to ensure that Samsung’s products meet GE’s technical 
specifications. 
 
Second, local suppliers may attempt to translate such explicit knowledge as 
production and quality control manuals, human resource management handbooks, and 
other literature transferred from flagships into their own production and quality control 
manuals and human resource management handbooks. They may be more compatible 
with local institutions and business behavior. Then a combination takes place from a set 
of explicit knowledge to a new set of explicit knowledge at the local suppliers. In this 
process, externalization of knowledge also takes place from tacit knowledge of local 
engineers and managers to explicit knowledge in the form a new set of manuals and 
handbooks. For instance, when Volvo took over the ownership of Samsung’s heavy 
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introduced its own management systems, which reflects both Volvo’s requirements and 
those shaped by local institutions. In developing a new set of manuals and handbooks, the 
ground was laid for internalization, combination and externalization. 
 
Third, the link with GPN also induces knowledge conversions within local 
suppliers. The key is the diffusion of locialized and internalized knowledge accumulated 
by a limited number of engineers and managers of the local suppliers through training 
provided by the network flagship. This knowledge needs to be diffused within local 
suppliers through spiral processes of socialization, as more actors in and around the firms 
get involved in knowledge conversion activities. Externalization and internalization take 
place internally, as actors convert from/to explicit to/from tacit knowledge within the 
local supplying firms, gradually developing embedded knowledge. For instance, 
Samsung Electronics recently sent a group of human resource management (HRM) 
specialists to GE to learn the latter’s HRM system. Upon return, these specialists have 
conducted a series of seminars for HRM specialists in the firm to share the knowledge, 
leading to the development of new HRM policy and procedures and to the gradual 
formation of new embedded knowledge.  
 
Fourth, knowledge conversion cannot take place without the active intervention 
of tacit knowledge. This is true even for the conversion from explicit knowledge to 
explicit knowledge. Once again, this highlights how important it is for local suppliers to 
develop a rich tacit knowledge base. In other words, the effectiveness and speed of 
knowledge conversion will be determined not so much by quantity and quality of the 
knowledge transferred by the flagships as by the absorptive capacity of the local 
suppliers. This holds regardless of the knowledge transfer mechanisms. The strength of 
the domestic knowledge base determines the level of sophistication of the converted 
knowledge, while the intensity of effort accelerates the speed of the conversion 
processes. In turn, spiral processes of knowledge conversion determine the level of the 
company’s internal knowledge base. Leading local suppliers thus invest heavily in 
recruiting the cream of the crop from universities; they also develop intensive training 




Liberalization, digital convergence, and intensifying global competition have 
produced a major organizational innovation: a transition from “multinational 
corporations” that exploit labor cost differentials in different countries to “global network 
flagships” that integrate their dispersed supply, knowledge, and customer bases into 
global (or regional) production networks. The paper demonstrates that these networks 
have boosted international knowledge diffusion, providing new opportunities for 
capability formation by local suppliers in developing countries. Under pressure from 
flagships, local suppliers have a strong incentive to internalize transferred knowledge 
through various forms of knowledge conversion. The baseline however is the absorptive 
capacity of the local suppliers: it determines the effectiveness of capability formation. 
 
  18 Policy and Management Implications 
 
Our analysis has important implications for global flagships and local suppliers. 
First, flagships should actively transfer to local suppliers not only encoded knowledge 
but also embrained, embedded, and encultured knowledge. Such a broad-based transfer 
of knowledge enhances the capabilities of local suppliers; it also strengthens the 
competitiveness of the flagships’ global production networks.  
 
Second, flagships might worry about a possible switching of local suppliers to 
other flagships, once the suppliers have reached a certain level of capabilities. The 
flagships can avoid this by raising the local suppliers’ switching costs. This can be done 
by helping the local suppliers develop the network-specific embedded systems and 
organizational culture through the active transfer of such knowledge. Once the local 
suppliers develop a strong embedded procedures and culture, which is tuned to those of 
the flagship, it is costly to switch to other GPN. 
 
Third, local suppliers need to take an active approach to maximize their benefits 
from network participation. Flagships place business orders and transfer valuable 
knowledge to local suppliers with only one objective in mind: to strengthen the 
competitiveness of their GPN. To maximize the benefit of such transfers, local suppliers 
must constantly upgrade their absorptive capacity. Their existing knowledge base is 
largely determined by the embrained knowledge of the firm. Local suppliers, therefore, 
should tap, develop, and retain highly skilled human resources for developing existing 
their knowledge base. More important is the intensity of effort. There may be various 
means to intensify effort. One possibility, illustrated by some Korean firms, is to 
construct a deliberate crisis by establishing ambitious goals (Kim, 1997, 1998).  
 
Fourth, as flagships transfer valuable knowledge to the first-tier local suppliers to 
strengthen the competitiveness of their GPN, higher-tier local suppliers should also help 
lower-tier suppliers build capability by transferring valuable knowledge to them in order 
to strengthen their own competitiveness. The competitiveness of GPN is determined by 
the competitiveness of each of the nodes in the networks.  
 
Priorities for Future Research 
 
We have seen that GPN transform the production and use of knowledge, 
considerably enhancing the mobility of knowledge. This may have far-reaching 
implications for an evolutionary theory of economic change. We suggest four main 
priorities for future research. 
 
A first priority is to move beyond the “flagship bias”. We need research on GPN, 
undertaken from the perspective of local suppliers that are located in small open 
economies and in developing countries. Some of the research questions include: Why do 
local suppliers join GPN? What are the advantages and disadvantages for local suppliers 
to take part in GPN? What are differences in learning and capability building between 
intra-firm suppliers and inter-firm suppliers?  
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A second research priority is to move beyond the current “production bias.” 
Digital convergence has created new opportunities for the exchange of knowledge-
intensive services across organizational and national boundaries. We need research on the 
evolving global networks of business and information services, and especially on the 
transformation of these networks through the Internet
6. Possible research questions 
include: What are   idiosyncratic features of service- oriented GPN? How do production 
GPN and service GPN differ in terms of their mobility, location dynamics, and their 
capacity to enhance knowledge transfer? And how does knowledge transfer take place in 
service GPN?  
 
Third, research needs to move beyond the current “R&D bias” and an exclusive 
preoccupation with the location of R&D and patents among major industrialized 
countries. We need to establish what forces explain that flagships are now beginning to 
outsource certain R&D activities to a handful of newly industrializing economies (NIEs) 
and even to some developing countries, and how this affects international knowledge 
transfer. Possible research questions include. What rationale explains such R&D 
outsourcing strategies to some NIEs? What distinguishes these arrangements from R&D 
alliances among leading American Japanese and European flagships? And how 
successful are the former arrangements? 
 
Finally, we still know little about how GPN differ by country of origin. GPN are 
no longer the exclusive playground for American flagships. Asia´s electronics industry 
for instance is shaped to a large degree by the patterns of cooperation and competition 
between networks that center on American flagships as well as on flagships from Japan, 
Europe, Taiwan, Singapore and Korea (Borrus, Ernst, and Haggard, 2000). This raises 
questions like
7: How do these networks differ in terms of their basic characteristics, such 
as accessibility, permanence, flexibility to respond to market and technology shifts, and 
governance? How do they differ in terms of their impact on international knowledge 
transfer? Does nationality of ownership matter? And is diversity primarily a result of 
peculiar features of national institutions, or are there other forces at work? 
 
                                                            
6 These issues are addressed in an international collaborative research project, coordinated by the East-
West Center, on “How the Internet Transforms Global Flagship Networks? And What This Implies for 
Knowledge Diffusion?” 
7 Ernst and Ravenhill (1999) explore the diversity of these networks in Asia, and the limits to convergence.  
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  Figure 3: Absorptive capacity of local suppliers 
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  Figure 4: The process of local capability formation 
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